Selling a Commercial
Landscaping Company (2026)

The commercial landscaping market in 2026

Commercial landscaping is one of the most fragmented service industries in the country, and that is the whole reason private equity is in it. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages counted an average of 123,326 private-sector landscaping services establishments (NAICS 561730), residential and commercial together, in 2025, employing an average of 912,821 people. That average hides the shape of the business: employment ran from 745,595 in January 2025 to 1,009,244 in June, a swing of about 35% inside a single year.

BrightView, the largest commercial landscaper in the United States, reports $2.67 billion of revenue for its fiscal year ended September 30, 2025, which it says is about four times its next largest commercial competitor. Even so, it holds what it calls “only a 1.5% share” of a commercial maintenance and snow removal market it sizes, citing IBISWorld, at $124 billion. The 150 largest firms on Landscape Management’s 2026 LM150 reported $22.3 billion of combined revenue. Everything below that line is the pool consolidators buy from.

One detail from BrightView’s annual report is worth knowing before you talk to any buyer. It describes a representative maintenance branch as one that “typically serves 25-150 customers across 50-250 sites, generating between $5 million and $20 million in annual revenues.” If your company does $5 million to $20 million, a consolidator sees a branch: a ready-made book of sites, crews, a yard and account managers it can drop into a market. That is the frame most offers are built in, and it is why route density and the people who hold the customer relationships matter as much as the profit line.

Who buys commercial landscaping companies

There are four kinds of buyers, and they do not pay the same way.

Private equity-backed platforms are the most active group by a wide margin. They buy add-ons for density in markets where they already operate, and new branches to enter markets where they do not. Many ask the seller to roll part of the price into equity in the platform. Private equity firms looking for a new platform buy a larger, well-run regional company to build around, and pay the highest multiples for it. Strategic and employee-owned acquirers, such as BrightView or the Davey Tree Expert Company, buy selectively. Individual and search fund buyers, usually financed with SBA loans, sit at the smaller end.

The table below lists the commercial landscaping consolidators we could verify from a primary source: a company or private equity firm press release, a law firm or banker deal announcement, or an SEC filing. Revenue is as reported to the 2026 LM150 for 2025 (for BrightView, its fiscal year ended September 30), which is self-reported and marks some figures as estimates.

Table sources: BrightView 10-K and 10-Q; Latham & Watkins (Yellowstone); Pritzker Private Capital via the Illinois Venture Capital Association and Sterling Investment Partners (HeartLand); One Rock Capital Partners (Monarch); Ruppert via PR Newswire and Ruppert; Visterra via Access Newswire and Generational Group; Landscape Workshop via Nasdaq; PE Professional and Landscape Management (archived) (Juniper); VCA Online (Clean Scapes); Capstone Partners (Bland); Holland & Knight (North American Lawn & Landscape); Landscape Management (archived) (LandCare); 2025 revenue from the 2026 LM150 (archived).

What the list tells an owner

The biggest name is not the busiest buyer. BrightView’s annual report says it “will selectively pursue accretive acquisitions that will focus on increasing market density to build upon our existing footprint in strategic markets, entering new attractive geographies,” and its June 2026 10-Q repeats the strategy. The money has not followed yet. Its cash flow statement shows $13.8 million of business acquisitions in fiscal 2023 and nothing in fiscal 2024 or 2025. Its revenue fell 3% in 2025 on the LM150, and in January 2024 it sold U.S. Lawns, its franchise business, to Riverside portfolio company EverSmith Brands, according to Jones Day. BrightView may well return to buying. An owner should not run a process that depends on it.

Integration cost is already in the buyer’s model. BrightView says it typically expects integration costs of “approximately 7%-9% of the acquisition price,” spent within 12 months. Every acquirer runs some version of that math, and the cleaner your systems, routes and reporting, the less of it they have to assume.

Competition among platforms is real. When Visterra announced its April 2025 acquisition of Herzog, the seller said in the release, “We had a high level of interest from other acquisition suitors.” Brad Goldstein, a director at Capstone, puts it more bluntly in the firm’s October 2026 report: “The traditional roll-up lanes are getting crowded as PE platforms are now competing for the same HVAC, pest, and landscaping add-ons.” Crowded lanes are good for a seller who puts several of those platforms in the same process at the same time.

Adjacent buyers widen the field. Capstone notes that buyer interest “has increasingly expanded into adjacent categories (e.g. tree care, irrigation, artificial turf).” Tree and plant health care platforms are logical bidders for a company with a strong tree line. SavATree, owned by funds advised by Apax since 2021, grew to 58 branches through organic growth and 27 add-on acquisitions under its prior owner, according to Paul, Weiss. The employee-owned Davey Tree Expert Company, with $1.95 billion of 2025 revenue, about 55% of it from utility work, reported approximately $8.5 million of investments in businesses in 2025.

For the difference between selling to a financial buyer and a strategic one, see Strategic Buyer vs. Private Equity Buyer, and for how serial acquirers change the negotiation, how buy-and-build roll-ups work.

What commercial landscaping companies sell for in 2026

Two measures of earnings drive landscaping valuations, and mixing them up is the fastest way to misread a multiple. Small owner-operated companies are priced on seller’s discretionary earnings (SDE), which adds back the full pay of one working owner. Companies large enough to attract private equity are priced on adjusted EBITDA, which keeps a market salary for whoever runs the business after you. SDE is the larger number for the same company, so an SDE multiple is always lower. EBITDA and Business Valuation Basics walks through both.

No public dataset with a disclosed sample gives commercial landscaping multiples by company size. What exists is a set of published views, each measuring a different population. Read the table from top to bottom as a rough picture of how price rises with size.

Table sources: FISART, October 2026 (including its BizBuySell median); CT Acquisitions, June 2026; Livingstone Partners, November 2024 (page updated August 2026); Capstone Partners, October 2026, citing Capital IQ.

How to read the ladder

The small end is a different market. FISART’s 2.49x median comes from BizBuySell businesses valued at $5 million or less, and Peak Business Valuation puts landscaping companies at 3.63x to 3.98x EBITDA without saying which dataset or size band that reflects. Both describe mostly owner-operated businesses. Neither is the right yardstick for a commercial company with account managers and a general manager.

The jump happens where a company can stand on its own. Livingstone’s ladder rises by more than half, from 3x to 5x for a tuck-in to 5x to 8x for a small platform or material add-on. The difference is not the lawns. It is whether the buyer is paying for a set of contracts it will fold into an existing branch, or for a management team, systems and a market position it can build on. Livingstone says private equity exits in the sector have seen “most EBITDA multiples between 7x and 15x,” which is the prize a platform buyer is underwriting when it pays up for the first company.

The public multiple is an anchor, not a ceiling or a floor. BrightView’s 6.9x is the price of a minority stake in a public company whose revenue fell 3% in fiscal 2025 before returning to modest growth in 2026. A private buyer acquiring control of a growing, well-run regional company can pay more than that, and a buyer acquiring a small, owner-dependent book will pay less. When an offer is presented against “where BrightView trades,” it is worth asking which of those two it is.

How buyers price each line of revenue

A buyer does not value “landscaping revenue.” It splits your income statement into lines and prices each one by how likely it is to repeat. BrightView’s fiscal 2025 numbers show the split at scale: $1,680.5 million of landscape maintenance, $210.8 million of snow removal and $789.1 million of development (construction). If your books do not separate those lines, with gross margin for each, the buyer will separate them for you, and will be conservative about it.

Contract maintenance: priced on who stays

BrightView describes its maintenance work as provided “under recurring annual contracts, which typically range from one to three years in duration and are generally cancellable by the customer with 30-90 days’ notice.” In its risk factors it is plainer still: its customers “can unilaterally terminate all services pursuant to the terms of our service agreements, without penalty.” Your contracts almost certainly read the same way, and a buyer knows it.

So the buyer prices behavior. Expect to be asked for revenue retention by account for at least three years, the price increases you passed through and what you lost when you did, and how many of your sites are controlled by a single property management firm. That last one is the concentration risk specific to commercial landscaping. A company can have 300 properties and no customer over 5% of revenue, and still have a third of its book controlled by two regional property managers. When a management firm loses a portfolio or rebids its vendors, many sites move at once. Buyers look through the property list to the people who sign the contracts.

Enhancements: credit for a pattern

Enhancement work, such as mulch, seasonal color, irrigation upgrades and tree work sold to existing customers, is not contracted. BrightView still treats it as predictable, saying its enhancements “typically have a predictable level of demand related to our amount of contracted revenue with a customer.” That is the argument to make with your own numbers: show enhancement revenue as a percentage of contract revenue by year and by account manager. A steady ratio earns credit as repeatable. A spike from one large irrigation job does not.

Snow: priced on an average winter

BrightView says snow removal services “are provided on either fixed fee based contracts or per occurrence contracts,” that part of its fixed-fee work is “subject to guaranteed minimum payments regardless of the season’s snowfall,” and that it benchmarks its results against ten- and thirty-year snowfall averages. Buyers do the same to you. If you are selling after a heavy winter, expect the buyer to restate your snow earnings to what an average winter would have produced, and to apply the multiple to that.

BrightView’s own 2026 results show why. In the nine months ended June 30, 2026, its snow removal revenue rose $82.7 million, or 39.2%, “due to increased snowfall in the period,” yet adjusted EBITDA for its Maintenance segment fell $4.7 million, which the company attributed mainly to a non-routine self-insurance adjustment and investment in its sales force. A big snow season did not show up as a big year, and a buyer will not pay you as if it had.

Contract structure changes how hard the normalization bites. CT Acquisitions describes four common forms: per-event pricing, a fixed seasonal fee paid regardless of how much snow falls, a capped hybrid with a flat seasonal price up to a contracted snowfall ceiling and per-event pricing above it, and time and materials, which it places at the bottom of the multiple band. A book of seasonal contracts with minimums looks like recurring revenue. A book of per-push accounts looks like weather. Subcontracted plow routes raise one more question: whether those operators come with the company.

Construction and design-build: a contractor’s business inside yours

BrightView says that in its Development business it is “typically hired by general contractors,” on contracts that run from two or three months to two or three years, and that “a significant portion of our contracts are subject to competitive bidding and/or are negotiated on a fixed- or capped-fee basis.” Its receivables included $58.3 million of retention on incomplete projects at the end of fiscal 2025. That is contractor economics: lumpy, bid-driven, exposed to cost overruns and to the general contractor’s schedule.

The discount buyers apply to construction is about predictability, not profitability. BrightView’s Development segment earned a 13.5% adjusted EBITDA margin in fiscal 2025, slightly above Maintenance at 13.0%. Livingstone lists “Cyclicality: Construction vs. Maintenance Mix” among the drivers of the multiple. Owners with a large construction arm should expect the buyer to value it on signed backlog and bid history, and in some processes to value it separately or not want it at all. The upside is that maintenance contracts which began as your own installs are a strong story, because they show the construction work feeding the recurring book.

What buyers diligence in a commercial landscaping company

Beyond the financial statements, these are the items that come up in almost every landscaping process, and the ones that move price late in a deal when they are not ready.

H-2B labor

Congress caps H-2B visas at 66,000 per fiscal year, 33,000 for each half, and USCIS says unused visas do not carry over into the next fiscal year. For the first half of fiscal 2027, USCIS announced on September 11, 2026 that it had received enough petitions to reach the cap, with a final receipt date of September 4. For fiscal 2026 the government added up to 64,716 supplemental visas, 46,226 of them reserved for returning workers, and employers using them had to attest to irreparable harm. Capstone’s October 2026 report singles this out: “In the Landscaping & Lawn Care market, distinct labor bottlenecks have emerged due to a seasonal dependence on the statutorily capped 66,000-visa H-2B program.”

BrightView reports employing approximately 1,500 seasonal workers through H-2B in fiscal 2025, down from about 2,000 in fiscal 2024. For a smaller company the dependence can be proportionally much larger. Expect a buyer to ask what share of your peak crew is H-2B, how many return year over year, when you file and through whom, your I-9 records and any audit history, and what you would do in a year your petition does not clear. A company that can show several seasons of reliable returning workers turns a risk into a strength, because, as Capstone puts it, acquirers have favored operators with “strong access to labor.”

Fleet, equipment and capital spending

Landscaping runs on trucks, trailers and mowers, and buyers know that EBITDA is earned before any of them are replaced. Livingstone notes that value can be expressed against cash flow, “e.g., EBITDA less maintenance capex.” BrightView, with approximately 15,000 trucks and trailers, spent $254.2 million on capital expenditures in fiscal 2025, about 9.5% of revenue, after $78.4 million, about 2.8%, the year before. The swing shows how much replacement spending can pile up and land in a single year.

If you have stretched the fleet to flatter the last two years of earnings, a buyer will find it in the equipment list and either lower the multiple or deduct the catch-up spending from the price. Equipment loans and finance leases are normally treated as debt and come out of the price at closing. The cleanest approach is an equipment register with age, hours and replacement schedule, and a capital spending history that matches it. Fleets also bring Department of Transportation and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration requirements for certain vehicles, which BrightView lists among the rules it is subject to.

Insurance, claims and snow liability

Slip-and-fall claims from snow and ice work, auto claims from a large fleet and workers’ compensation from field crews are the three insurance lines buyers study. BrightView self-insures part of each: its programs for “workers’ compensation, general liability, auto liability and employee health care for certain employees contain self-insured retention amounts.” Expect a buyer to request several years of loss runs from your carriers. Open claims and an adverse trend become escrow and indemnity negotiations, and are better explained by you up front than discovered by the buyer.

Licenses and chemical application

Federal rules require certification for anyone applying restricted use pesticides, and the EPA lists certification programs in all 50 states. State rules for commercial applicators beyond that vary, so check with your state agency. Where a license is held personally by the owner or one employee, a buyer treats it as a transfer risk and will want a plan for who holds it after closing.

Workforce structure

Livingstone lists “Self-perform vs. Subcontracted” and “W-2 vs. 1099” among the value drivers. Self-performed work gives the buyer control of quality and margin. Heavy use of 1099 crews invites worker classification questions in diligence. Neither is disqualifying, but both need to be explained with numbers.

Seasonality and the working capital target

BrightView says its revenue and net income are typically higher in the spring and summer and that it also experiences seasonality “in our employment and working capital needs.” In a sale, that matters because most purchase agreements set a working capital target, and the price moves up or down by however much you deliver above or below it at closing. A target set on a single month, or on the wrong season, can quietly cost a landscaping seller real money. The target should reflect a trailing twelve-month average that captures the seasonal cycle, and the closing date should be chosen with it in mind. See The Working Capital Peg for how the adjustment works.

What moves a commercial landscaping company up or down the range

Capstone summarizes what acquirers want in one sentence: “Acquirers have favored operators with recurring maintenance exposure, recurring service programs, and strong access to labor.” FISART’s table names premium and discount drivers for landscaping directly. Combined with the items above, the picture looks like this.

Route density deserves a word, because it is the economic engine of every consolidator in this industry. Drive time between sites is paid labor that nobody bills for. A company whose properties sit close together earns more on the same contract prices, and a buyer with a branch nearby can often run your routes more cheaply still. That is the synergy a platform is paying for when it buys for density, and it is part of why the right buyer can pay more than the average one. Capstone names “route density economics” among the reasons investors stay attracted to the sector.

How a headline price turns into cash: a hypothetical example

Every figure in this example is invented to show the arithmetic. None is a market benchmark or a pricing opinion.

Consider a hypothetical commercial landscaping company with $20 million of revenue: $14 million of contract maintenance, $3 million of enhancements, $1.5 million of snow and $1.5 million of construction. After the usual owner adjustments, it shows $2,600,000 of adjusted EBITDA, a 13% margin, close to BrightView’s 13.2% for fiscal 2025.

Snow normalization. Last winter was heavy. Snow contributed $450,000 of EBITDA, against about $250,000 in an average winter on the company’s own ten-year history. The buyer restates it: $2,600,000 − $200,000 = $2,400,000 of normalized EBITDA.

Enterprise value. At a hypothetical 6.0x, enterprise value is $2,400,000 × 6.0 = $14,400,000. The snow adjustment alone cost $1,200,000 of headline price, which is why the snow history should be prepared before a buyer prepares it for you.

Equity value. The company has $1,400,000 of equipment loans and finance leases, paid off at closing. The buyer’s fleet review finds $500,000 of overdue replacements, which it negotiates as a price reduction. Closing falls in June, and working capital comes in $150,000 below the agreed target. $14,400,000 − $1,400,000 − $500,000 − $150,000 = $12,350,000 equity value.

Cash at closing. The buyer is a private equity platform buying the company as a material add-on. It asks the owner to roll $2,400,000 into equity in the platform and holds back a $700,000 escrow. $12,350,000 − $2,400,000 − $700,000 = $9,250,000 cash at closing, before advisory and legal fees and taxes. That is 64% of the headline enterprise value. The escrow may be released later, and the rollover has value only when the platform itself sells, which is the second bite the platform is offering. For how to judge that rollover, see Rollover Equity Explained, and for escrows and earnouts, Earnouts, Escrows, and Holdbacks. For what you keep after fees and taxes, see What You Keep After Selling Your Business.

Preparing a commercial landscaping company for sale

The work that moves price in this industry is mostly reporting, and most of it takes a full season to show. Starting 12 to 24 months before a sale, in rough order of value:

• Split the books by service line. Maintenance, enhancements, snow and construction, each with revenue and gross margin by month. This one change answers half of a buyer’s diligence list.
• Build the retention report. Revenue by account for three or more years, with wins, losses and price increases, and the property manager behind each site.
• Document the snow history. Revenue and margin by season next to local snowfall, and the contract mix of seasonal, capped and per-push accounts.
• Get the fleet in order. An equipment register with age, hours and condition, and a replacement plan you have actually been following.
• Put the labor file together. H-2B petitions and approvals by year, returning-worker rates, I-9 records and crew turnover.
• Move relationships off the owner. The account managers and branch managers who handle customers day to day are what a buyer is acquiring. See How to Reduce Owner Dependence Before Selling.
• Consider a sell-side quality of earnings review. It finds the snow, capital spending and working capital questions before the buyer’s accountants do. See Quality of Earnings Reports.

On timing, the IBBA and M&A Source Q2 2026 Market Pulse survey (all industries) found that lower middle market deals averaged 11 to 12 months from engagement to close. In landscaping, the calendar adds its own constraint: buyers want to see a full season, and an owner running crews in May has little time for a data room. Many owners find it easier to prepare and go to market in the late fall and winter. See How Long Does It Take to Sell a Business.

How landscaping compares with other services sectors

On FISART’s table, landscaping’s 4.5x median sits well below pest control’s 6.5x. The difference is the contract. FISART’s premium tier for pest control assumes monthly or quarterly service contracts that are 80%+ recurring with low cancellation; for landscaping, commercial contracts that are 60%+ recurring. A landscaping contract gets rebid. The companies that close that gap are the ones that can prove their customers stay anyway. For the wider sector, see what business services companies sell for and our business services M&A advisory page. For another trade where private equity consolidation sets the price, see HVAC and plumbing valuation multiples.

Getting a preliminary read on what your company is worth

Salt Creek Advisory is a family-owned investment bank run by brothers Jack Pitts and Connor Pitts, who work directly with owners of companies with about $2 million to $75 million in revenue. In a landscaping sale, our job is to put the platforms in the table above, and the ones not on it, in front of your company at the same time, and to make sure the snow, fleet and working capital questions are answered on your terms before a buyer frames them. For standard M&A engagements there is no upfront retainer, and the success fee is earned when a transaction closes.

If you want a starting range before talking to anyone, the Value My Business tool lets you choose commercial landscape maintenance or landscape design and build. It starts from Salt Creek’s working ranges of 4.0x to 6.5x EBITDA for commercial maintenance and 3.5x to 5.5x for design and build, built from published ranges like the ones above. The result is a directional estimate, not a formal valuation or appraisal. If you are holding an offer from one of these platforms, a conversation about how it compares costs nothing and commits you to nothing.

Frequently asked questions

What multiple do commercial landscaping companies sell for in 2026? It depends mostly on size. Livingstone Partners publishes an illustrative ladder of 3x to 5x EBITDA for a small tuck-in, 5x to 8x for a platform or material add-on under $8 million of EBITDA, 7x to 12x at $8 million to $20 million, and 12x to 15x above $20 million. FISART’s guide values put landscaping at 3.5x to 6.0x EBITDA with a 4.5x median, and BrightView traded at 6.9x trailing EBITDA on July 27, 2026, according to Capstone Partners. None of these discloses a sample size, so treat them as ranges to reason from, not a price.

Is BrightView buying landscaping companies? Not recently. BrightView says it will “selectively pursue accretive acquisitions” and calls itself the acquirer of choice, but its fiscal 2025 10-K shows no business acquisitions in fiscal 2024 or 2025, and its June 2026 10-Q shows none in the first nine months of fiscal 2026. The active buyers are private equity-backed platforms.

Who are the biggest buyers of commercial landscaping companies? Private equity-backed platforms do most of the buying. Those we could verify include Yellowstone Landscape (Harvest Partners), HeartLand (Pritzker Private Capital), Monarch Landscape Companies (Audax), Ruppert Landscape (Knox Lane), Visterra Landscape Group (Trinity Hunt), Landscape Workshop (Ares), Juniper Landscaping (Bregal Partners), Clean Scapes (Blue Sage Capital) and Bland Landscaping (Comvest). Tree care platforms and new private equity platforms add to the field.

How do buyers value snow removal revenue? They normalize it to an average winter. BrightView benchmarks its own snow results against ten- and thirty-year snowfall averages, and buyers apply the same logic to a seller. Fixed seasonal contracts with guaranteed minimums are treated as close to recurring; per-push work is treated as weather. In the nine months to June 30, 2026, BrightView’s snow revenue rose 39.2%, yet its Maintenance segment’s adjusted EBITDA fell $4.7 million, mainly on a non-routine self-insurance charge. The extra snow revenue did not turn into a better year.

Does construction or design-build work lower my valuation? It usually earns a lower multiple than maintenance, because it is project-based, competitively bid and often fixed-price, not because it is less profitable. BrightView’s Development segment earned a 13.5% adjusted EBITDA margin in fiscal 2025, against 13.0% for Maintenance. Buyers value construction on backlog and bid history, and some value it separately or prefer not to buy it.

My maintenance contracts can be canceled on 30 days’ notice. Are they worth anything to a buyer? Yes, if you can show that customers stay. Most of BrightView’s own maintenance agreements can be canceled by either party on 30 days’ notice, and buyers know that is normal. What they price is retention history by account, price increases that held, and how many sites depend on a few property management firms.

How does H-2B labor affect the sale of a landscaping company? Buyers treat it as a supply risk to underwrite. Congress caps H-2B visas at 66,000 a year, the first-half cap for fiscal 2027 was reached with a final receipt date of September 4, 2026, and landscaping accounted for 31.3% of H-2B labor certifications in fiscal 2023 data analyzed by the American Immigration Council. Expect questions on your H-2B share of peak crew, returning-worker rates, I-9 records and your fallback plan.

Should I replace equipment before selling my landscaping company? Not necessarily, but do not let it fall behind. Buyers look at EBITDA less maintenance capital spending, and deferred replacement shows up in the equipment list. It is either deducted from the price or reflected in a lower multiple. An equipment register with age, hours and a replacement plan you have followed does more for value than a last-minute fleet purchase.

How long does it take to sell a commercial landscaping company? In the IBBA and M&A Source Q2 2026 survey (all industries), lower middle market deals averaged 11 to 12 months from engagement to close. Landscaping adds a seasonal constraint, since buyers want to see a full season and owners are busiest in spring and summer, so many owners prepare and go to market in the late fall and winter.

Should I sell as an add-on or try to become a platform? It depends on your EBITDA and management team more than your preference. On Livingstone’s illustrative ladder, the multiple rises by more than half, from 3x to 5x for a tuck-in to 5x to 8x for a platform or material add-on under $8 million of EBITDA. A company with a management team, systems and a defensible market can attract platform interest. A smaller, owner-run book is usually most valuable to a platform already operating nearby, which is why running a process with several of them at once matters.

Sources

• BrightView Holdings, “Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025”, filed November 2025.
• BrightView Holdings, “Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026”, filed August 2026.
• BrightView Holdings, “Third quarter fiscal 2026 results (Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1)”, August 2026.
• Capstone Partners, “Residential Services M&A Coverage Report”, October 2026.
• Livingstone Partners, “Commercial Landscaping: An Owner’s Guide to Private Equity Activity and Valuation Considerations”, November 2024, updated August 2026.
• FISART, “EBITDA Multiples by Industry 2026: Complete Data Table”, October 2026.
• CT Acquisitions, “SDE Multiples by Industry in 2026: Seller’s Discretionary Earnings Multiplier Ranges Across 30+ Sectors”, updated June 5, 2026.
• CT Acquisitions, “Snow Removal Business Valuation 2026”, updated June 24, 2026.
• Peak Business Valuation, “Landscaping Valuation Multiples”, updated July 20, 2026.
• U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, landscaping services (NAICS 561730), employment”, 2025 annual average.
• U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, landscaping services (NAICS 561730), establishments”, 2025 annual average.
• Landscape Management, “LM150 2026 rankings (web.archive.org copy of July 17, 2026)”, 2026.
• Landscape Management, “LM150 analysis: top landscape companies drive $22 billion in revenue (web.archive.org copy)”, 2026.
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Cap Count for H-2B Nonimmigrants”, accessed October 2026.
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Temporary Increase in H-2B Nonimmigrant Visas for FY 2026”, 2026.
• American Immigration Council, “The Expanding Role of H-2B Workers in the United States”, October 2024, updated November 2025.
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Certification Standards for Pesticide Applicators”, undated.
• Latham & Watkins, “Latham & Watkins Represents Neuberger Berman Capital Solutions in Minority Investment in Yellowstone”, December 2024.
• Illinois Venture Capital Association, “Pritzker Private Capital Acquires HeartLand”, December 2023.
• Sterling Investment Partners, “Sterling Investment Partners Announces Sale of HeartLand to Pritzker Private Capital”, December 2023.
• One Rock Capital Partners, “One Rock Capital Partners Sells Monarch Landscape Companies to Audax Private Equity”, 2022.
• Ruppert Landscape via PR Newswire, “Ruppert Landscape Gives Employees $28 Million in Appreciation Bonuses Following Announcement of Strategic Partnership with Knox Lane”, December 8, 2022.
• Ruppert Landscape, “Ruppert Landscape Enters South Carolina Market with Acquisition of The Greenery of Charleston”, January 2024.
• Visterra Landscape Group via Access Newswire, “Visterra Strengthens South Shore Massachusetts Operations”, April 22, 2025.
• Generational Group, “Generational Group Advises Liberty Lawn & Landscaping in Its Sale to Visterra Landscape Group”, April 17, 2026 (deal closed December 1, 2025).
• Landscape Workshop via Nasdaq, “Landscape Workshop Acquired by Ares Management”, May 19, 2025.
• PE Professional, “Bregal Keeps Seeing Green at Latest Roll-Up”, June 2026.
• Landscape Management, “Juniper Landscaping Partners with Private Equity Firm (web.archive.org copy)”, January 11, 2022.
• VCA Online, “Blue Sage Capital Invests in Clean Scapes Landscaping”, July 10, 2025.
• Capstone Partners, “Capstone Partners Advised Comvest on Its Acquisition of Bland Landscaping Company”, December 2024.
• Holland & Knight, “H&K Advises Reynolda Equity Partners in Acquisition of North American Lawn & Landscape”, October 2025.
• Landscape Management, “Aurora Resurgence Sells LandCare to Management Group (web.archive.org copy)”, July 2019.
• Jones Day, “Riverside Portfolio Company Acquires U.S. Lawns”, February 2024.
• Paul, Weiss, “SavATree to Be Acquired by Funds Advised by Apax”, August 2021.
• The Davey Tree Expert Company, “Form 10-K for fiscal year 2025”, filed 2026.
• IBBA and M&A Source via PR Newswire, “The Market Pulse Survey Q2 2026 Reports the Latest Trends in Business Sales up to $50M”, August 25, 2026.